costa at tsaousis.gr
Thu May 28 07:32:21 BST 2015
ssh-faker is a kind of honeypot. You can contribute your logs to
blocklist.de if you like (I also added all their lists in
update-ipsets.sh yesterday, check
https://github.com/ktsaou/blocklist-ipsets - I also added a section on
this page for the lists I trust
FireHOL v3 also supports knocks, so instead of approving IPs for ssh
access, you can enable ssh for an IP, only if you first get a connect
on port A, then B, the C within 10 seconds, in which case ssh is open
for this IP for 30 seconds.
You can also stop port scans with FireHOL v3. You block an IP if you
get more than X attempts to connect on not-allowed different IPs or
different ports within a few seconds. This is very effective. You can
honeypot any port you like. You can honeypot IPs too. If you use
synproxy with this, the attacker will believe there is a server
On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 1:10 AM, Rick Marshall <rjm at zenucom.com> wrote:
> Thanks for that Costa. I need to think some more on this, but I agree it's
> all in the lists - ingress yes, but egress seems to be the big one for
> serious fraud.
> Just to update according to Trend cybercrime last year worldwide was $450b
> and in the next 2-3 years is expected to reach $3t ! It's more than big
> I think your most interesting point was the poisoned list problem. The way
> these things work >50,000 new addresses/urls are identified every day
> (mostly urls I expect) which also means a lot disappear as well. Maintaining
> good lists without poisoning is difficult enough.
> We also use ssh-faker to block access to ssh in the first place - except for
> approved IPs. Sort of a 2-phase access and it's been very effective.
> Still no good answer for social engineering :(
> On 28/05/2015 1:17 am, Tsaousis, Costa wrote:
> live not leave! ok! :-)
> On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 5:02 PM, Tsaousis, Costa <costa at tsaousis.gr> wrote:
> I have to add that at the end of the day, what you need is lists, i.e.
> patterns the bad guys use:
> 1. IP blocklists to stop the bad guys at the network level
> 2. Application layer blocklists to stop known application level attacks
> 3. URL or domain blocklists to prevent your systems from contacting the bad
> 4. Intrusion detection lists that are capable of analyzing all the
> layers of communication and alert you when something is wrong
> Most security companies this is what they do. They maintain such kinds
> of lists. Even an anti-virus is a list of patterns and heuristics.
> Of course security companies also provide customized services, they
> collect your logs to correlate the traces of the attackers and figure
> out what the attackers did or trying to do. But at the end of day,
> they will block them at the firewall. When you are under an attack you
> may not afford to let the application level security handle it. If the
> attack is massive, these layers will go out of resources quickly. So
> what you need is a way to block them at the firewall.
> This is why I think ipsets are a key component (and I push it so
> much). They really share key knowledge between all of us.
> Of course, there are more to be learned. What will happen if a key
> blocklist most people trust is poisoned? What if somehow they have a
> large number of random false positives? Do they rank dynamic IPs
> What seems missing at my view, is that the security teams around the
> world have not yet found a way to exchange their knowledge is a
> structured way, quickly. Each team, each company does whatever sees
> fit. A few release IP lists, others have DNSBLs, others provide their
> lists with a very well defined retention policy, others do not say
> anything about their policies, how they remove false positives, how
> they rank the attacks, etc. The InfoSec community seems very cryptic
> at my eyes... or probably it is still at its very first steps.
> At the other hand, global fraud is a 30bn USD business. The fraudsters
> and attackers are pros...
> Anyway, as I see it, the firewall builds walls. Blocklists are like
> doors on these walls, they allow some, they block some.
> Would you leave in a home without doors?
> On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 10:24 AM, Tsaousis, Costa <costa at tsaousis.gr> wrote:
> Hi Rick.
> They are right. C&C was not just a promo. Even the attack I faced,
> from the outside, was mainly originating from C&C hosts around the
> Protecting a LAN of personal computers needs a different strategy
> compared to protecting a LAN of servers.
> For the servers for example a basic strategy should be something like this:
> 1. A good layer 3 firewall in the front, with stateful connection
> tracking, possibly with synproxy to help against SYN floods and a few
> basic traps to prevent port scans. FireHOL v3+ is good at this.
> synproxy support is excellent and its traps are like layer-3
> 2. A few blocklists to keep the well known bad guys out of the
> services your firewall allows to pass. FireHOL v3+ is also good at
> this. Of course, the blocklists will not help you much if you get a
> zero-day attack (you are first to be attacked on the net).
> 3. An application level security layer (e.g. modsecurity for http).
> This will detect known attacks at the application layer (sql
> injection, known application vulnerabilities, etc). This also works
> with lists (pattern matching rules) that should be updated frequently.
> 4. fail2ban on all services where possible (you should even contribute
> to the blocklists with this). This will protect you against brute
> force attacks.
> 5. all outgoing http/https requests the servers make should go through
> a proxy, so that you can monitor what your servers are requesting from
> the internet and possibly add some security there (url blocklists -
> the 3rd set of lists you will need, anti-malware and anti-virus
> checks). Also, tt the firewall level, you should not have "client all
> accept" for servers. You should allow very specific things, probably
> with 'src' and 'dst' on every client rule.
> Some guys also add a snort just behind the firewall that sniffs all
> traffic and logs anomalies. In this case you will need a 4th type of
> lists, the snort alert rules. If you do this, then most probably you
> should add an ssl accelerator somewhere, so that it can read https
> traffic (this is also required if you add modsecurity).
> You can also contribute to the overall internet security by installing
> application honeyports - this will be a contribution to blocklists.
> Finally, you can design your application to handle security
> information, such as IP reputation data. Project Honey Pot provides
> such a mechanism through DNS (httpbl.org).
> On a LAN of personal computers, things are different. In this case the
> blocklists will help you after you are infected (there are a few lists
> that will block viruses, like zeus, feodo, pelevo, etc), but generally
> your public IPs will appear on the blocklists... On LAN PCs a proxy
> with anti-virus and anti-malware is required and a good anti-virus
> anti-malware is required on every PC, especially Windows. A snort
> installation can also help to detect anomalies on a LAN of PCs.
> On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 2:51 AM, Rick Marshall <rjm at zenucom.com> wrote:
> I haven't looked at this closely yet :( Been rather busy :(:(
> However, I did have time to attend a security seminar headed by Trend Micro.
> Obviously this had a large promotion of their idea of security and how
> things are happening.
> All good.
> Question is that it seems the biggest threat now is from infected devices
> inside the network talking on their own - viruses/trojans etc to what Trend
> is calling command and control (C&C) servers that are directing the deep
> So, my question, we have traditionally focused on external threats in to the
> organisation. Can I now turn around and track internal going out (ie packets
> originated inside the network) and going to known C&C servers then
> log/report the originating machine and the destination C&C. Would identify
> infected machines and devices - phones etc - without having to worry about
> up to date anti-virus software for some of the more serious threats.
> I suspect this is the basis of many of the devices sold by companies like
> Trend and it is certainly a strengthening of firewalls.
> This would be valuable even if I have to subscribe to a frequently (hourly?)
> updated list of C&Cs.
> Please feel free to ell me this is already well covered. If not perhaps we
> could consider it.
> Thanks Costa.
> On 27/05/2015 8:59 am, Tsaousis, Costa wrote:
> It seems I am right.
> This says that the number of entries in an ipset does not affect its
> So, only the number of individual ipsets will make a difference and of
> course if you run blacklist(s) in 'full' or 'input'.
> On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 1:26 AM, Tsaousis, Costa <costa at tsaousis.gr>
> Hi Whit,
> You are right to be concerned. I have not done any full tests on
> performance. However this is my experience so far:
> I believe there is no problem with big ipsets. Actually the number of
> IPs in an ipset might not be so relevant. The ipsets are sized so that
> one lookup per packet will do the job, even if there are hundreds of
> thousands of IPs in the ipset (I have not read the kernel source, but
> from the ipset configuration I see that there is a hashing algorithm
> that is sized properly to accomplish this and in a few cases when an
> ipset is updated from the command line, the kernel logs that re-hashed
> it). update-ipsets.sh forces a rehash by creating an new ipset and
> swapping the active with the new during the update.
> There are also a few very simple ways to speed it up, if you are so
> 1. If you need to use 10 blacklists, create one bigger, so that
> instead of 10 lookups, only 1 will be made. There is a tool (iprange)
> included in the contrib dir of firehol that can aggregate ipsets,
> giving an optimized netset result (example: cat *.ipset *.netset |
> grep -v "^#" | ./iprange -J). This can also be done with the standard
> aggregate tool on most distros (although it is significantly slower
> than iprange). This is a nice feature for update-ipsets.sh too. I'll
> add it...
> 2. Use the blacklist firehol helper with 'input' not 'full'. This will
> only check the FIRST packet of each connection, NOT ALL the packets.
> This limits the packets to be checked significantly.
> I have a few demanding installations:
> a. I use a few ipsets with tens of thousands of IPs each, on a
> firewall server that has sustained traffic from 30 to 50 Mbps, with
> one blacklist per ipset (so that I get a log with the ipset name that
> matched it), each of them running in 'full' mode (all packets
> checked). The overhead is ignorable. I cannot tell the difference with
> and without the blacklists active...
> b. I have another server/gateway with 4 VDSLs and 4 ADSLs (more than
> 250Mbps at peak) running again several ipsets in a similar fashion.
> Again I cannot tell the difference...
> Even on my home gateway, with a simple J1900 machine (a celeron quad
> core cpu) running ALL the ipsets in 'full' mode on my ADSL link, with
> the link at 100% utilization (20 Mbps in total: up + down), I cannot
> tell the difference with and without the blacklists...
> Keep in mind that I have not measured it. This is just the "feeling" I
> have by observing 'top' and 'vmstat'...
> On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 12:09 AM, Whit Blauvelt <whit at transpect.com>
> Hi Costa,
> Since you've pushed ipsets so far, have you seen any noticable system
> performance issues when there are thousands, or tens of thousands, of
> IPs in
> your ipsets? On the one hand I'm thinking, "What a great idea. I'll just
> blacklist all the IPs on the blacklists." On the other hand, there must
> some threshold where it becomes computationally expensive, and I don't
> the measure of that.
> Firehol-support mailing list
> Firehol-support at lists.firehol.org
> *Rick Marshall*
> Zenucom Pty Ltd
> 0411 287530
> Firehol-support mailing list
> Firehol-support at lists.firehol.org
> Rick Marshall
> Zenucom Pty Ltd
> 0411 287530
More information about the Firehol-support